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Adopting an epistemic communities approach, this article outlines how U.S. foreign 
policy elites have constructed their response to recent events in Egypt.  It argues that 
through the discursive deployment of elite power a neoliberal-security policy 
paradigm has been constructed and institutionalised.  This policy seeks to promote a 
democratic transition in the long-term whilst also allowing U.S. elites to pursue more 
immediate security interests.  However, tensions in the policy are evident as a result 
of continued flows of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt that are contributing to the 
continuation of an Egyptian-Military-industrial-commercial complex that threatens 
the likelihood of any democratic transition. 




That the production of U.S. foreign and security policy is elite-led is not a new 
observation.  Indeed, foreign and defence policies are almost wholly delegated to a 
small elite ‘on the grounds that dealing with other states requires secrecy, continuity, 
experience and personal contacts’ (Hill, 2003, 42).  Thus, even within mature 
democracies, foreign policy is largely made on their population’s behalf by small and 
increasingly transnational elites.  The implications of this, for understanding the 
nature of U.S. foreign and security policy, are important.  At the core of the American 
foreign and security policy are a limited number of strategic agents located within 
specific parts of the state system.  These individuals are the custodians of the 
machinery of state who provide the primary justifications and overall vision of 
foreign and security policy projects.  These core elites are supported by, and are often 
drawn from, a wider epistemic community of policy-making elites who have policy 
relevant knowledge, such as those in the wider academic, business, lobby groups, 
military, non-governmental organisations and think-tank communities.  Whilst the 
core foreign policy elite is reliant on these institutions intelligence gathering skills and 
knowledge resources, they establish international policy agendas by virtue of a shared 
value consensus, an agreement over the ‘rules of the game’, and contribute to 
processes of policy dialogue and official policy narratives (Hassan, 2013, 31–55).  
Such observations are hardly innovative, but they do build on insights that are very 
much part of modern elitist state theory, and they provide a starting point for the 
analysis of elite power (see Evans, 2006).   
This article takes these premises as the basis for developing an understanding of how 
U.S. foreign policy elites have constructed U.S. policy towards Egypt in the aftermath 
of the so-called “Arab Awakening”.  More specifically, it outlines an epistemic 
communities approach to briefly set out a theoretically driven, but empirically rich, 
argument that places an emphasis on elite discourses and elite interpretations in the 
construction, reproduction and institutionalisation of elite power.  After briefly 
establishing the theoretical framework, this article turns to U.S. elite’s discourse 
towards Egypt and establishes that U.S. foreign policy elites have constructed a 
“neoliberal-security paradigm”.  Using this policy paradigm as a heuristic tool 
captures the manner in which the U.S. foreign policy elite has constructed a discourse 
to justify the simultaneous pursuit of both democracy promotion and near term 
security interests.  It also allows the article to explore the rationalisations 
underpinning U.S. elites actions towards Egypt, by exposing the assumptions 
embedded in the U.S. elite’s discourse and the resultant policy.  As such, it is 
determined that the U.S. foreign policy elite is operating with a neoliberal economic 
doctrine.  This is rationalised by U.S. elites based on the assumption that open 
markets and free trade will not only provide Egypt with economic stability, but also 
create modernisation processes and the rule of law.  In turn, it is perceived as 
inevitable that these will result in a democratic transformation and the production of a 
democratic peace.  Simultaneously, the elite’s discourse also allows for cooperation 
with the Egyptian government, whether that is in the guise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood or the Egyptian military, under the rubric of national security interests 
such as counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation cooperation and the 
implementation of the Arab-Israeli peace treaty. 
Once the underling assumptions of the neoliberal-security paradigm have been 
established, this article turns to exploring the internal contradictions and silences with 
in the elite discourse and the policy paradigm.  It argues that the military coup d’état 
in July 2013, that has seen the rise of President Abdul-Fattah El-Sisi, marked a 
moment of crisis within the U.S. elites discourse that required the use of the elites 
discursive power to prevent a paradigmatic failure.  The events in Egypt directly 
exposed conflicting interests between trying to promote democracy and supporting 
the Egyptian military through U.S. foreign assistance.  As a result, to maintain the 
neoliberal-security paradigm, the U.S. elite deliberately remained silent on labelling 
the events following July 2013 as a “coup d’état” that would have required an 
alternative policy paradigm to be put in place. This in turn reveals the dynamics of 
elite power remaining silent over the contradictions of promoting neoliberal economic 
reforms in the pursuit of democracy whilst providing Egypt with the second highest 
level of U.S. foreign aid.  The contradictions and effects of attempting to promote 
neoliberal reforms designed to generate a modern free market economy and provide 
the basis for a democratic transition, whilst also supporting what is in effect a rent in 
the form of a $74 billion since 1948.  This reveals serious problems with the 
neoliberal-security paradigm that are not addressed by the U.S. elite, but that will 
continue to have significant effects on Egypt’s political and economic situation 
through the systemic perpetuation of a military-industrial-commercial complex.  
Epistemic Communities and Elite Power 
The epistemic communities approach is a modern elitist state theory best outlined by 
Adler and Haas in the early 1990s.  Attempting to set out a theory for the ‘sources of 
international institutions, state interests, and state behaviour under conditions of 
uncertainty’ they established an elitist state theory that amounts to a theoretically 
driven ‘research program’ that demands empirically rich accounts of the role of ideas 
in international relations (Adler & Haas, 1992, 367).  Policy elites are not just policy-
makers, but also those who structurally act as a filter mechanism to preclude inputs 
into policy debate.  As such, policy elites within epistemic communities include 
stakeholders in professions and with backgrounds in natural and social sciences who 
have access and the ability to disseminate, shape and preclude certain types of policy 
relevant knowledge.  Within this context, policy elite’s interpretations need to be 
fundamentally understood, as it is interpretations that mediate between issues of 
structure and agency. Within this context, it is argued that policy elite’s 
interpretations need to be fundamentally understood, as it is interpretations that 
mediate between issues of structure and agency.  Policy elites assess circumstances 
and identify interests in attempts at problem solving; they interpret what is politically 
feasible, practical and desirable.  For Adler and Haas, the epistemic communities 
approach collapses ridged distinctions between the domestic and international spheres 
with the objective of gaining ‘depth and understanding’ (Adler & Haas, 1992, 367-8).  
In this manner, there is a clear departure from more traditionally parsimonious elitist 
state theories such as that of The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills.  For example, Mills 
argued that, 
The conception of the power elite and of its unity rests upon the corresponding 
developments and the coincidence of interests among economic, political, and 
military organisations.  It also rests upon the similarity of origins and outlook, 
and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these 
dominant hierarchies (Mills, 1956, 292). 
Whilst there is an intellectual resonance with such a position, the epistemic 
communities approach adopts a more nuanced and mature position in its 
understanding of elites.  Indeed, significant departures mark the approach out as very 
much a modern elitist perspective.  For the epistemic communities approach dialogue 
and bargaining within and between epistemic communities occurs, drawing on the 
policy-elites knowledge base, but also on the skills and knowledge resources of those 
within the wider epistemic community.  As a result, inclusion in the epistemic 
community is less linked to the similarity of origins and outlook typified in older 
elitist approaches, and rather draws on membership based on a common policy 
enterprise and access to knowledge and skills resources (See Adler & Haas, 1992; 
Evans, 2006, 51).  This is particularly fecund in a globalised international 
environment where foreign policy elites draw on expertise from a wide range of 
international sources such as foreign-based NGOs, think tanks and academics and not 
just from domestic sources.  Indeed, this blurs the lines between elites being recruited 
to an epistemic community based on instrumental criteria and intellectual merit.  
Defining policy-elites in this way renders apparent the manner in which epistemic 
communities inherently produce and reproduce ‘elite power’.  This is possible 
through their role as institutionalising interpreters dealing with dynamic conditions of 
uncertainty.  Underpinning this function is the role of discourse.  As Stuart Hall 
explains, by ‘discourse’ what is being referred to is, 
A group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way 
of representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic.  When 
statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse 
makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way.  It also limits the 
other ways in which the topic can be constructed (Hall 1996b: 201). 
Within this context, the ‘elite power’ of an epistemic community cannot simply be 
synonymously reduced to a simple product of class, ethnicity, gender or broader 
social origins.  Rather, policy elites are reliant on social power, which presupposes a 
power base of privileged access to scare social resources, ‘such as force, money, 
status, fame, knowledge, information, “culture”, or indeed various forms of public 
discourse and communication’ (Van Dijk, 2001, 355).  As Teun A. van Dijk outlines,  
Members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their 
leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to, and control over, 
one or more types of public discourse … Those who have more control over 
more – and more influential – discourse … are by definition also more 
powerful (2001, 356).   
The importance of this in U.S. foreign policy is that, as an epistemic community, the 
foreign policy elite possesses power through its ability to shape and control public 
discourse on foreign policy issues.  This is a product of how epistemic communities 
are constructed from a ‘network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain’ who demonstrate ‘an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, 3).  As a 
result of their power base, and in particular their privileged access to foreign policy 
relevant knowledge and information, they are able to construct the context and 
structures of relevant policy knowledge whilst excluding others.  The U.S. foreign 
policy elite is therefore able to define, for example, the construction of national 
interests.  Moreover, as custodians of the machinery of the state, they have a 
privileged position from which to operationalize their strategies for pursuing their 
goals and objectives. 
The methodological importance of this is that to identify and question the U.S. foreign 
policy elite’s power requires de-structuring the knowledge and information that 
underpins their power base.  That is to say, it requires the identification of the 
structured set of ideas, in the form of ‘implicit and sedimented assumptions, upon 
which actors might draw in formulating strategy and indeed, in legitimising strategy’ 
(Hay & Rosamond, 2002, 151).  It is within this context that the U.S. foreign policy 
approach towards Egypt can be best referred to as following a ‘neoliberal-security 
paradigm’, which is a direct expression of elite power and their ability to shape and 
control the public discourse. 
Elite Discourse and the Production of Policy Paradigms 
The neoliberal-security paradigm is a term used here as a heuristic characterisation of 
the U.S. foreign policy elites constructed approach to relations with Egypt.  That is to 
say, it is not a term that would be recognised by the elites themselves, and it is not a 
term that is used within the current academic and policy debates.  Rather it is 
deliberately distant and reflective term used to characterise the core components of an 
epistemic communities paradigmatic discourse and expression of elite power.  As the 
name suggests, it highlights how discourses of neoliberal economics have become 
articulated with discourses of security through sedimented assumptions that are 
reified into elite practices.  The term also highlights how elite power is embedded into 
an interpretive framework in and through discourse.  This then becomes reified in a 
policy paradigm operated by, and across, foreign policy elites and institutions.  
Indeed, as Peter A. Hall describes, 
Policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards 
that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can 
be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant 
to be addressing … this framework is embedded in the very terminology 
through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is 
influential precisely because so much is taken for granted and unnameable to 
scrutiny as a whole … this interpretive framework [is] a policy paradigm 
(1993, p. 279) 
A policy paradigm acts as a source of guidance for conducting and evaluating policies 
and defines the range of legitimate methods available.  This in turn demarcates the 
very intentions and objectives of policy itself.  This in short ‘comes to circumscribe 
the realm of the politically feasible, practical and desirable’ (Hay, 2001, p. 197).  This 
is particularly significant given that there is a strong tendency in the U.S. foreign 
policy literature to categorise American foreign policy towards the Middle East as 
either “realist” or “idealist”. That is to say, a policy that should be led by strategic 
interests versus a policy that should be driven by the need to promote democracy (for 
an overview see Brown & Hawthorne, 2010; Hassan, 2013, 11–30; Youngs, 2010).  
Whilst this analytical division is useful in understanding general approaches and 
schools of thought, it fails to capture the manner in which elites and their discourses 
have over the last decade attempted to reconcile the two positions.  The utility of 
referring to the policy paradigm underlying the U.S. foreign policy towards the 
Middle East, as the neoliberal-security paradigm, is that it breaks with these more 
general categorisations of U.S. foreign policy in favour of a more nuanced 
understanding of how elite discourse is reified into practices.  Indeed, for over a 
decade U.S. foreign policy elites have both publically and privately sought to 
champion the need for political and economic reform in the Middle East region whilst 
pursuing core strategic interests (Carothers, 2012; Hassan, 2008; Lynch, 2013).  The 
neoliberal-security paradigm better captures this tension, whilst highlighting how on 
the one hand the U.S. foreign policy elite champion human rights and democracy and, 
on the other, cooperate with autocratic regimes in the pursuit of more immediate 
security concerns. The neoliberal-security paradigm is the epistemic communities 
approach to focusing on what Henry Kissinger referred to as “the hinge” in U.S. 
foreign policy (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 29–55). 
De-structuring the Neoliberal-Security Paradigm 
When asked “what constitutes American national security interests in Egypt?” senior 
U.S. State Department officials assert that firstly, ‘this be a democratic transition, and 
not just a transition’, secondly, ‘security in the Sini and counter-terrorism 
cooperation’, thirdly, ‘cooperation on proliferation and cooperation on the smuggling 
of weapons from elsewhere in the region’, fourthly, ‘the implementation of the Arab-
Israeli peace treaty’, and finally, ‘a stable and strong Egypt that will be a good player 
in the region’.  Pushed further, the same elites identify interests in overfly rights and 
access to the Suez Canal, but in a single line define their national interests in Egypt as 
requiring ‘a democratic Egypt that is ultimately more stable and a reliable partner for 
the United States’. 1  With such a wide array of national interests in Egypt, inevitable 
                                                             
1 Interview with author in Washington D.C. throughout 2013-14, conducted under the condition 
of anonymity.  
tensions emerge.  The elite discourse attempts to reconcile these conflicting interests 
and institutionalise them in practice through the neoliberal-security paradigm.   
Used as a heuristic term, the “neoliberal-security paradigm” points to the two central 
organising discourses the U.S. foreign policy elite have constructed to guide and 
justify their policy towards Egypt.  The term captures the manner in which the U.S. 
foreign policy elite pursues both an intellectual rationale for an indirect and 
incremental approach to democratisation through economic liberalisation, in the name 
of security and long-term stability, whilst also maintaining relationships with 
autocratic regimes in the pursuit of more immediate security concerns.  For the U.S. 
foreign policy elite, this approach reduces the pressures of a “conflict of interests” 
problem at the heart of U.S.-Egyptian relations.  Whilst neoliberalism has provided 
the U.S. foreign policy elite with an intellectual articulation between democracy, 
development, governance, civil society and long-term security, this is seen as a long-
term approach that will incrementally lead to democratic transitions.  In turn, this 
provides the U.S. elite with the freedom of pursuing near term interests without using 
other policy instruments to overtly pressure autocratic partners into pursuing political 
reforms.  The temporal sequencing within the discourse, differentiating between short 
and long-term interests, has the effect of emolliating the overt tensions within the 
paradigm as a whole.   
The elite rationale for adopting the neoliberal-security paradigm is evident within 
their discourse and the assumptions upon which it relies.  Neoliberalism, which 
started out as a theory of political economy, suggests that human well-being can be 
best delivered by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills.  However, 
as David Harvey points out, ‘neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a 
mode of discourse’ (2005, 3).  In this capacity, neoliberalism has spread beyond its 
origins as a theory of political economy to become a central ordering discourse for 
U.S. foreign policy elites.  These elites have come to believe that human progress is 
best advanced through liberating individuals within institutional frameworks that 
enhance private property rights, free markets, and free trade.  As such, they seek to 
promote political-economic practices that liberate individuals and limit the power of 
the state.  The role of the state, as Harvey summarises, is to, 
Set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions 
required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, 
the proper functioning of markets.  Furthermore, if markets do not exist … 
then they must be created, by state action if necessary.  But beyond these tasks 
the state should not venture (Harvey, 2005, 2). 
Central to this discourse are definitions of “freedom” and “progress” underpinned by 
a conception of how social “modernisation” occurs.  Within the discourse free 
markets and free trade rules are both economic and political.  They are not only seen 
as necessary for generating wealth, but as a means of enhancing the overall freedoms 
enjoyed by the individual.  As Secretary Clinton explained, ‘trying to have economic 
freedom and growth without accompanying political openness is just a recipe for an 
internal collision’ (Clinton, 2010a).  The rationale for this is that U.S. foreign policy 
elites believe that there is ‘an inherent contradiction between economic freedom and 
the lack of political freedom, and so there will have to be adjustments made’ (Clinton, 
2010b).  As such, the promotion of what the Obama administration has 
interchangeably referred to as “economic freedom”, “economic liberalisation”, 
“economic empowerment”, and “prosperity”, is seen as a means of delivering not just 
“economic progress”, but also “political progress”, “sustainable development” and 
“dignity”. 
The U.S. foreign policy elites promotion of economic freedom is linked to an inherent 
understanding of how economic freedom can contribute to social modernisation in 
two ways.  The first of these resonates with what political scientists refer to as 
modernisation thesis, and an understanding of how liberalisation and democratisation 
are linked to political economy (see Bridoux & Kurki, 2014, 76).  For U.S. elites, 
positive political change can be achieved through pursuing policies of economic 
growth that result from integration into the global market.  This is a theory of political 
change, which posits modernisation as a functionalist and economistic outcome of 
capitalism.  The globalisation of capitalism, and in particular the neoliberal reforms 
embedded into this discourse by U.S. and other global elites, is portrayed as a method 
of reducing poverty and unemployment, but also of starting processes of 
democratisation.  Thus,  
The idea is that free-market reforms can act as tools for democratisation, 
because economic liberalisation, and the economic growth it generates, will 
build an independent middle class that will demand secure property rights, due 
process of law, and eventually political rights and freedoms from their 
governments (Wittes & Yerkes, 2006, 6). 
Within this schema economic freedom is paramount, and capitalism is seen as 
fundamental to processes of democratisation because it produces wealth that is 
assumed will “trickle down” and lead to a higher level of mass consumption, and a 
well-educated and independent middle class that will demand cultural changes 
favourable to democracy.  For the Obama administration this is seen as a fundamental 
processes in creating “peace, stability and prosperity” as it helps to “grow the middle 
class”, by providing “inclusive growth” and create a “new middle class” to fulfil the 
“promise of economic statecraft”.  The direct benefits of this to the U.S. have 
however not been lost on U.S. elites, who identify that,  
Mutual opportunities for growth in subnational agreements create a vortex of 
opportunity for U.S. business growth, jobs growth, and industry growth. 
Fueled by the expansion of a … middle class, a whole range of American 
companies and products – from communications equipment to automotive 
manufacturing – have expanding markets (Lewis, 2011). 
Accordingly, it is easy to see how those challenging the neoliberal discourse have 
come to see the U.S. elites definition of “freedom” as exogenous to the societies they 
are seeking to modernise.  Rather, neoliberalism has come to be seen by many as 
reflecting the elite power and interests of ‘private property owners, businesses, 
multinational corporations, and financial capital’ (Harvey, 2005, 7).  Moreover, as 
Marina Ottaway (2011) argues, ‘trade doesn’t cost us [the U.S.] anything’. 
The second modality in which U.S. elites have come to see neoliberal reforms as 
contributing to social modernisation is through its contribution to the rule of law (see 
Bridoux & Kurki, 2014, 59).  Within this schema, economic statecraft is used as a 
method of promoting good governance, that it is envisaged will contribute to the 
creation of democratic governance in the long term. As Secretary of State Clinton 
explained,  
Over the long run, you can’t have effective economic liberalization without 
political liberalization. Without the rule of law, people with a good business 
idea or money to invest cannot trust that contracts will be honored and 
corruption punished, or that regulations will be transparent and disputes 
resolved fairly, and so many will end up looking for opportunities elsewhere, 
some even migrating out of their countries of origin (Clinton, 2012). 
The importance of this rule of law approach, embedded in the neoliberal discourse, is 
that economic statecraft is being seen as a foothold for promoting gradual political 
liberalisation and democratisation processes. Economic governance is not only seen 
by U.S. elites as a method of growing innovation, investment and industry, but also 
cultures of transparency and accountability.  U.S. foreign policy elites articulate this 
neoliberal rule of law approach as a method of indirectly promoting independent 
judiciaries and free presses, which it is hoped will symbiotically assist in gradual 
strengthening of civil societies, human rights and free elections as the cornerstones of 
democratic processes and institutions (See Clinton, 2009).  
The U.S. foreign policy elite’s articulation of economic liberalisation through a 
neoliberal discourse is particularly revealing of both its democratisation and security 
strategy for the Middle East and North Africa.  Privately these elites acknowledge that 
they have a knowledge gap in understanding how ‘modernisation from below’ 
operates, as ‘social mobilisation is difficult to predict’.2  However, the neoliberal 
discourse fills this intellectual gap as these policy makers attempt to solve problems 
through their policy initiatives.  In this way, neoliberalism has become fundamentally 
sediment into the elites policy paradigm and practices.  The discourse serves a distinct 
purpose of not only meeting these elites economic interests, but of also allowing them 
to justify economic liberalisation and political liberalisation as a national security 
objective.  For many of these elites, altruistically promoting democracy in and of 
itself is not the policy objective.  Rather, democracy promotion, through economic 
liberalisation, is seen as a ‘means of creating a more stable ends’.3  The importance of 
this is that as a ‘means to an ends’, democracy promotion has become securitised and 
inherently linked with the elites objectives of regional stability and the potential of a 
democratic peace. 
With a neoliberal discourse embedded in and through the U.S. foreign policy elites 
discourse, its relationship to security has become reified in U.S. policy objectives.  It 
has become part of what elites in the Obama administration refer to as ‘the long 
game’ (see Carothers, 2013).  Promoting the values of economic and political 
liberalisation is now seen to be a long-term gradual, indirect and quieter method of 
international engagement.  Yet, the discourse also provides an enabling function of 
allowing the Obama administration to pursue its more immediate security objectives 
in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation whilst cooperating with the Egyptian 
government under the discursive construction of national security interests.  There is 
also a sense in which lessons learnt from the failures of the G. W. Bush 
administration’s Freedom Agenda, the invasion of Iraq, and the consequences of 
pushing for elections only to empower Islamist parties hostile to Washington are 
embedded in the discourse (See Carothers, 2012, 2013; Hassan, 2013). 
Institutionalising the Policy Paradigm 
                                                             
2 Quote taken from anonymous interviews with author conducted in Washington D.C. throughout September-December 2013. 
3 Quote taken from anonymous interviews with author conducted in Washington D.C. throughout September-December 2013. 
The manner in which the neoliberal-security discourse is reified in U.S. policy 
towards Egypt became apparent following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks and 
the institutionalisation of President George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda.  From 2002, 
the G.W. Bush administration identified Egypt as a country in need of long-term 
incremental political transformation.  Central to these efforts were the three main 
Freedom Agenda institutions, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the 
Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA) and the Broader Middle East and North 
Africa initiative (BMENA).  Whilst these institutionalised wide conceptual 
commitments ranging from political liberalisation, education and women’s rights, the 
core programming across all three emphasised economic liberalisation and reform.  In 
the case of MEFTA, the George W. Bush administration explicitly tied this to, what 
was then termed, a ‘competitive liberalisation strategy’ (Schott, 2004, p. 362).  
Attacking protectionism in the region was motivated more by geopolitical and 
security considerations and less by economic concerns.  The rationale was that 
countries in the MENA who were eager for greater access to US markets would vie 
for Washington’s attention and approval, and in return for liberalising their economies 
MENA governments would avoid legitimation crises by diffusing popular 
dissatisfaction (Hassan, 2013).  This is clearly a strategy that has fundamentally 
failed, evident in the uprisings that swept through the Middle East and North Africa in 
early 2011. 
Following the uprisings, however, the Obama administration has increasingly 
emphasised the importance of economic liberalisation building on the legacy of G.W. 
Bush’s Freedom Agenda.  The neoliberal strategy may have failed to deliver peace 
and stability, but the uprisings have clearly not provided a critical moment of 
punctuation for U.S. elites to question the neoliberal-security paradigm.  As such, the 
Obama administration has significantly extended the neoliberal-security paradigm. 
The President made clear in the early months of the revolution that the U.S. would 
‘promote reform across the region, and … support transitions to democracy’ (Obama, 
2011). Whilst imprecise, this overarching objective for Egypt and the wider region 
adopted a particularly neoliberal flavour.  The U.S. launched the Middle East 
Response Fund (MERF), creating a new U.S.-Egyptian Enterprise Fund, in principle 
reliving Egypt of up to $1 billion in debt, providing Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) loan guarantees of up to $1 billion, supporting job creation 
through Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) development, and providing letters of 
credit.  In return for this economic assistance, the U.S. also sought to boost trade with 
Egypt through the MENA Trade and Investment Partnership (MENA-TIP), stimulate 
greater private sector growth and activity, and expand exports through Qualifying 
Industrial Zones (QIZs) (Greenfield & Balfour, 2012).  Indeed, in spite of the counter-
revolution being consolidated with the electoral victory of President Sisi, by 
November 2014, the U.S. sent the largest-ever trade delegation to Egypt to explore 
business opportunities.  This was just a month after President Sisi addressed the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and members of the U.S-Egypt Business Council in New 
York.  As one Congressional Research Service Report summarised,  
 
A key focus [of the U.S.] is the role that economic growth can play in 
solidifying and supporting political transitions in the region … U.S. trade and 
investment policy in the region is focused on using trade and investment to 
foster economic growth, promote greater economic reforms, provide support 
for successful and stable democratic transitions, and generally support U.S. 
foreign policy objectives (Akhtar, Bolle, & Nelson, 2013) 
 
Rather than adopting a directly overt approach, the Obama administration has opted to 
pursue its democracy promotion policy through economic liberalisation.  In effect, the 
“neoliberal” side of the paradigm has become institutionalised in U.S.-Egyptian 
relations.  President Obama’s MENA-TIP, for example, is merely an extension of 
much of the thinking behind President G.W. Bush’s MEFTA.  Moreover, with the 
institutionalisation of the neoliberal-security paradigm, the Obama administration has 
set out the basis of the U.S. elites long-term strategy for the region.  This has been 
enabled by the temporal differentiation embedded within the discourse.  Fundamental 
to the operationalization of the paradigm is that the discourse promises immediate and 
necessary action on the security side of the paradigm in the name of national interests, 
whilst promising further security through incrementally engineering a democratic 
utopia in the future.  This allows the elite to argue that it is promoting democracy and 
projecting normative values, but also that it is necessary to pursue more immediate 
security concerns by backing President Sisi and the so-called ‘military-led transition’ 
(Sharp, 2014, p. 5).  This temporal dimension allows the claims that the U.S. is 
seeking both its interests in democracy and near term security simultaneously and 
legitimises the tools the elite deploy in pursuing such ends.  
 
Tensions in the Paradigm  
 
The most visible element of the U.S. continuing its more traditional security 
programme in Egypt is evident in both the level and durability of U.S. foreign aid to 
Egypt.  Whilst between 1946 and 1978 US foreign assistance to Egypt would receive 
approximately $4 billion, from 1979 to 2013 this swelled to approximately $70 
billion.  To date, this has totalled $73.174 billion over the duration of the relationship 
(Sharp, 2014).4  The steep rise in foreign aid funding to Egypt followed the signing of 
the Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty and the establishment of a “cold peace” between Israel 
and Egypt.  For the U.S. elite this has proved fundamental to Egyptian-Israeli peace, 
and provided a corner stone of U.S.-Egyptian relations that has persists into the 
twenty-first century.  Thus, although the nature of U.S.-Egyptian relations since 1979 
has been turbulent, it has ultimately remained assured.  Indeed, the strength of the 
relationship has led some to regard Egypt as a client state of the U.S. (Chomsky, 
1999, 64; Ide, 2014, 87). 
 
The importance of the U.S.-Egyptian foreign aid relationship cannot be understated.  
Within the U.S. elites discourse it is seen as fundamental to ensuring Arab-Israeli 
peace is maintained, but also as a method of providing the U.S. with a regional ally 
and security partner.  This was certainly set out by Secretary Clinton, in perhaps the 
most succinct expression of the neoliberal-security paradigm,  
 
Egypt has been a partner of the United States over the last 30 years, has been 
instrumental in keeping the peace in the Middle East between Egypt and 
Israel, which is a critical accomplishment that has meant so much to so many 
people. So I think we have to keep on the message we’ve been on, convey that 
publicly and privately, as we are doing, and stand ready to help with the kind 
                                                             
4 Figures are not adjusted for inflation and are, therefore, represented in historical dollars.  
of transition that will lead to greater political and economic freedom (Clinton, 
2011). 
Whilst such a statement testifies to the seamless nature in which U.S. elites articulate 
both a traditional security discourse and a neoliberal discourse, this does not, however 
mean that there are not serious tensions within the neoliberal-security paradigm itself.  
Indeed, the nature of the internal tensions within the discourse were made highly 
evident following the Egyptian military’s seizure of power in July 2013 that saw the 
removal the Egypt’s first free and fairly elected President Morsi removed from power.  
This provided a moment of crisis for the neoliberal-security paradigm and challenged 
the U.S. elite’s ability to maintain an internally coherent discourse. 
The U.S. elite’s initial uncertainties regarding the electoral success of President Morsi 
and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) were alleviated by 
the continued facilitation of the neoliberal-security paradigm (see Hormats, 2012). In 
an initial experimentation period the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian military and 
wider Egyptian elites sought an accommodation (El-Sherif, 2014, 14). As senior 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing the FJP made political 
overtures towards the U.S., in return for political support and economic assistance, it 
became evident that they regarded U.S. support as crucial to the maintenance of their 
power.  As Nael Shama explains, ‘Morsi’s new domestic allies, particularly the 
military, had a vested interest in safeguarding the alliance with the U.S. to ensure the 
flow of US military aid and training’ (2014, 228). This demonstrated the 
Brotherhood’s compatibility with U.S. national interests, which was further 
epitomised in November 2012 when President Morsi helped mediate a ceasefire 
between Israel and Hamas (Shama, 2014, 228).  This also allowed U.S. elites to 
maintain their ‘long-term investment’ in the military.  As Secretary Kerry explained,  
We are getting a return on that investment that is not inconsequential … The 
army … is helping us enforce security in the Sinai. The army is also helping 
us enforce the Gaza peace, and the Gaza peace has held (Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 2013, 16). 
However, as anti-Muslim Brotherhood popular protests spread throughout the country 
in June-July 2013, old elites seized the opportunity to switch allegiances.  This 
facilitated the Egyptian military’s unilateral decision to dissolve the Morsi 
government, suspend the constitution and install Adil Mansour as the interim 
president pending a new election (El-Sherif, 2014; Sharp, 2014).  This proved 
problematic for U.S. elites as it provided a counter-revolutionary moment that 
undermined Egypt’s democratic transition and created instability.  This, in turn, 
provided a moment of crisis within the elite discourse.  The events risked challenging 
the discourses overall structure by exposing the tensions between supporting an 
elected President and a democratic transition and backing the military seizure of 
power.  
The response from President Obama was that,  
The United States does not support particular individuals or political parties, 
but we are committed to the democratic process and respect for the rule of law 
… we are deeply concerned by the decision of the Egyptian Armed Forces to 
remove President Morsy and suspend the Egyptian constitution. I now call on 
the Egyptian military to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority 
back to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible … I 
have also directed the relevant departments and agencies to review the 
implications under U.S. law for our assistance to the Government of Egypt 
(Obama, 2013). 
Over the coming months as the military began to violently crackdown on the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the dynamics and fragility of the U.S. elites discourse were exposed.  As 
a result, the Obama administration withheld 125 M1-A1 battle tank kits, twenty F-16 
fighter jets, twenty Harpoon cruise missiles, ten Apache attack helicopters, and 
suspended U.S. participation in Operation Bright Star (Hawthorne, 2014).5  This was 
significant to the extent that it was the first time a U.S. administration had ever 
suspended any proportion of the $1.3 billion package in military aid, but the 
administration’s overall response was more revealing.  The annual foreign operations 
appropriations act prohibited the issuing of foreign assistance to a country whose 
elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree (see 
Congress, 2012, 7008).  The Obama administration, however, determined that, 
Egypt serves as a stabilizing pillar of regional peace and security, and the 
United States has a national security interest in a stable and successful 
democratic transition in Egypt. The law does not require us to make a formal 
determination – that is a review that we have undergone – as to whether a 
coup took place, and it is not in our national interest to make such a 
determination (emphasis added Psaki, 2013). 
The Obama administration’s discursive act of refusing to determine that a coup d’état 
had taken place was deeply significant.  It allowed the majority of military aid to flow 
to Egypt, but also allowed U.S. elites to signal their displeasure by withholding 
“prestige” items and showing that there was at least a price for the Egyptian military’s 
actions (see Wittes, 2013).  In a clear demonstration of the U.S. foreign policy elites 
discursive power, they were able to circumvent legislation and down play the 
importance of the events so as to continue the pursuit of the neoliberal-security 
paradigm. When a clear conflict of interests emerged, between supporting a potential 
democratic transition and pursuing security, the U.S. foreign policy elite pursued the 
latter whilst insisting that the former come to fruition in the future.  The importance of 
the temporal functioning of the discourse cannot be understated, as it was 
fundamental in maintaining the eventual appearance of internal consistency within the 
discourse itself. 
The Seventy-Four Billion Dollar Problem 
That the Egyptian military’s coup d’état could cause such an acute crisis within the 
U.S. elite’s discourse is symptomatic of the wider tensions within the neoliberal-
security paradigm.  It provides a tangible instance of U.S. foreign aid policy 
conflicting with the objective of promoting democracy through a neoliberal doctrine. 
Yet, this instance is also symptomatic of wider structural problems within the 
paradigm that the U.S. elite has failed to address. This is particularly fecund given the 
role that the Egyptian military played in counter-revolutionary practices, and is 
symptomatic of what Root, Li and Balasuriya refer to as ‘the alliance curse’ (2009, 
46).  Whilst the U.S. elite argues that neoliberal reforms provide a route 
democratisation through processes of modernisation and the construction of cultures 
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favourable to the rule of law, U.S. foreign aid is in tension with these processes.  
Foreign aid acts as a “free resource” that reduces ‘pressure for regime modernisation, 
reducing the imperative for sitting governments to develop accountability 
mechanisms to their own people’ (Root et al., 2009, 41–2).  The U.S. role here should 
not be overstated, especially given the role of Gulf states in financing Egyptian fiscal 
deficits, but nor should the U.S. role in distorting Egyptian domestic politics and 
economy be ignored (see Hassan, 2015).   
U.S. foreign aid to Egypt is primarily delivered through three accounts; Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military 
Education and Training (IMET).  Of the $1.56 billion per annum in U.S. foreign aid 
to Egypt, FMF has amounts to approximately 83.5% of this total, compared to 16% in 
ESF and below 1% in IMET.  Whilst the U.S. Congress appropriates the precise 
allocation of these funds, the FMF account is administered by the U.S. Department of 
State and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense.  The FMF account is then 
used for the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defence 
contractors.  Sales of goods and services are, however, conducted through 
government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS), coordinated by Office of 
Military Cooperation (OMC) based in the U.S. embassy in Cairo.  In effect the U.S. 
government buys products for Egypt through this procurement channel and Egypt 
does not receive a cash transfer (see Sharp, 2014, 18–40). 
The importance of this procurement channel is two-fold.  Firstly, in its current 
configuration it points to a complication in cancelling U.S. FMS.  The Egyptian FMF 
account is intrinsically linked to the U.S. military-industrial complex, and adjusting or 
cancelling FMS would have an impact on U.S. defence contractors.  FMF operates as 
subsidy for U.S. defence contractors.  Secondly, however, the U.S. military-industrial 
complex is intrinsically connected to Egyptian elites and an Egyptian military-
industrial-commercial complex.  This is directly the case, for example, with the 
coproduction of M1A1 Tank kits produced in Michigan but assembled in a factory in 
Cairo.  Nevertheless, with the Egyptian military allocating few national funds to the 
procurement of U.S. military equipment purchases, the Egyptian military has been 
able to allocate resources elsewhere.  FMF is therefore a subsidy to the Egyptian 
military (see Schenker, 2013). Given the military’s ability to allocate funds elsewhere, 
its ownership of land, and access to military recruits as a de facto workforce, the 
Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex has spread to the wider economy 
creating a ‘military-run commercial enterprise that seeps into every corner of 
Egyptian Society’ (Stier, 2011).  This includes the manufacturing of a wide range of 
items such as cars, clothes, kitchen appliances, gas bottles, and food, but extends into 
hotels and resorts.  Estimates of the military owned percentage of the national 
economy vary as widely as 5-40% (Blumberg, 2011).  By acting as a subsidy, 
therefore, FMF plays a systemic role in perpetuating a political economy in which the 
Egyptian military is a deeply significant player with strongly vested interests.  In 
terms of the neoliberal-security paradigm, this situation is contrary to the U.S. foreign 
policy elite’s objectives and is masked within the discourse itself.  
Moreover, the role of the military in the Egyptian economy has expanded since July 
2013.  This was cemented with the election that saw President Sisi officially take 
power in June 2014, but has been underpinned by state stimulus spending and capital 
from the Gulf, which has allowed the Egyptian military to expand into new sectors 
previously controlled by large corporations (Adly, 2014, 1).  As Samer Atallah 
argues, ‘the military came to the forefront of the political arena to protect its 
economic interests.  But these interests are the main roadblock to real and credible 
political change in Egypt’ (Atallah, 2014).  In effect, what’s emerging in Egypt is a 
neo-authoritarian national security regime ran by an elite set of actors willing to seize 
state power to further their economic interests and patronage networks.   
This raises questions regarding even the long-term effectiveness of the neoliberal-
security paradigm. Egypt has undertaken varying degrees of economic reform since 
its retreat from Arab Nationalism and the institutionalisation of the 1974 infitah 
(“open door”) policy.  In the 1980s and 1990s this saw the ‘imposition of neo-liberal 
economic policies through stabilisation and structural adjustment agreements’ 
(Beinin, 2012, 20).  Since 2004, Egypt pursued a more vigorous implementation of 
neoliberal policies, which correlated with a rise of neo-authoritarianism justified by 
the Mubarak regime as necessary to crack down on Islamic violence. As Joel Beinin 
demonstrates in significant detail, rather than a greater privatised Egyptian economy 
leading to the creation of entrepreneurs with access to global capital seeking greater 
political power, what emerged was a form of crony capitalism and neoliberal 
opposition movements (Beinin, 2012, 26–32).  This is contrary to assumptions within 
the U.S. elite’s discourse regarding the sequencing between neoliberal reforms 
leading to emergent trends in modernisation and the rule of law.  Neoliberalism in 
Egypt transforms into crony capitalism, where entrepreneurs have moved closer to the 
patronage of the regime whilst movements such as Kifaya (“Enough”) have emerged 
in part as a result of opposition to neoliberal reforms (Beinin, 2012).   
The persistence of crony capitalism and the increased economic roll of the military in 
Egypt demonstrate that there is a fundamental silence within U.S. elites discourse and 
that the neoliberal-security paradigm is problematic.  Whilst U.S. elites operate on 
assumptions that the policies institutionalised after the Arab Awakening will provide 
both democracy in the long-term and security in the short-term this remains 
questionable.  U.S. foreign aid is contributing to the systemic reproduction of an 
Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex that is empowering Egyptian elites 
through a merger of guns and money. At the same time, neoliberal reforms are being 
institutionalised into corrupt practices and patronage networks between the military 
and a class of private business.  Formal trade liberalisation is not giving rise to an 
independent middle class, but rather is distorted through unequal competitive 
pressures under the direct control of the current ruling elite. Neoliberalism is 
empowering an Egyptian elite that is seizing the opportunities of privatisation through 
unequal access to financial services (see Wurzel, 2012). Neoliberal reforms, when 
institutionalised in Egypt, are not creating transparency in a real market economy, nor 
are they providing the basis for sustainable development for lower social strata in a 
country of enormous wealth inequality.  They are further empowering an elite who 
under the banner of free market reforms empower themselves, whilst also redirecting 
state wealth and public funds towards supporting their own profits.  This hardly 
appears to be the basis of a democratic transition in the short, medium, or long term, 
nor the basis of sound policy-making from U.S. elites and the epistemic communities 
they belong to.  
Conclusion 
Understanding how U.S. foreign policy elites are embedded in epistemic communities 
can provide significant insights into the wider U.S. relationship with the Middle East 
and North Africa, but also demonstrate how elites construct policy paradigms through 
interpretation and discursive power.  This was apparent in the aftermath of the “Arab 
awakening”, when U.S foreign policy elites drew on familiar discourses to justify 
both their overarching strategy and the deployment of policy instruments towards 
Egypt.  Indeed, the neoliberal-security paradigm is a hybrid discourse that bares all 
the hallmarks of the “Washington Consensus” and the “war on terror”.  Neoliberalism 
has become defined as an incremental pathway to greater prosperity, peace and 
freedom, whilst simultaneously counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and regional 
stability have justified the maintenance of strong relations with the Egyptian military 
and the continued flow of U.S. foreign aid.  Elite power has helped to mask the 
tensions between these two approaches, but it has not removed what are fundamental 
tensions within the U.S. elite’s discourse.  
A closer analysis of the U.S. elites discourse reveals that there are serious and 
significant problems, which need to be addressed even if the Obama administration 
wants to ‘play the long game’.  Supplying the Egyptian military with FMF is not only 
empowering elites, but also helping to create interest structures that have proved 
counter-productive to Egypt’s democratic transition.  The U.S. is contributing to the 
systemic expansion of an Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex that is 
now willing to play a more active role in protecting its interests in domestic politics.  
U.S. elites are also contributing to the creation of crony capitalism that is serving the 
needs of the few and has little hope of creating a modern free market economy. That 
the Obama administration opted to continue with large flows of U.S. foreign aid to 
Egypt following the July 2013 coup d’état demonstrates a symptomatic problem.  
When a “coup d’état” cannot be deemed a “coup d’état” in the interests of national 
security, farce becomes tragedy.  This is particularly the case when the existence of 
the Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex would seem to suggest that 
peace in the region is in the interests of the Egyptian military as much as U.S. elites.  
However, the continuation of the neoliberal-security paradigm is testimony to the lack 
of alternative ideas and a lack of imagination within the U.S. foreign policy elite.  The 
neoliberal-security paradigm may well be an intricate articulation that balances 
democracy promotion, economic statecraft and security, but there appear to be at least 
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